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inTernaTional Criminal CourT
iCC proSeCuTor deClineS To purSue 
drC allegaTionS in bemba CaSe
In June 2010, Congolese victims who 
claimed to have suffered crimes at the 
hands of the Movement for the Liberation 
of Congo (MLC) asked the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) to review the Prosecutor’s 
decision not yet to prosecute Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo for crimes allegedly com-
mitted in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). Bemba is the former vice 
president of Congo and leader of the 
MLC, a group that controlled a large part 
of northeastern and northwestern Congo 
from 1998 to 2003. The Prosecutor charged 
Bemba with two counts of crimes against 
humanity and three counts of war crimes 
for his alleged role in rape, murder, and 
pillaging committed during the 2002-2003 
coup d’etat in the Central African Republic 
(CAR). The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
and Human Rights Watch have also impli-
cated Bemba’s MLC in several crimes 
against civilians in northern Congo, stem-
ming from a military operation initiated 
by the group in 2002. The OTP will try to 
prove that Bemba had command over the 
MLC troops in the CAR, but has yet to 
indicate any intention of prosecuting the 
crimes allegedly committed in the DRC.
On October 25, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
declined the Congolese victims’ request. 
Victims’ rights in this capacity are addressed 
by Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, which allows victims to make 
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
Pre-Trial Chamber I explained that the 
Prosecutor has not yet made a formal deci-
sion not to investigate the alleged crimes 
in the DRC. In response, human rights 
organizations have noted that no action 
has been taken despite the Prosecutor’s 
use of the MLC’s modus operandi in the 
DRC to demonstrate that Bemba should 
have known MLC troops were likely to 
commit crimes in the CAR. Because the 
Prosecution is using the MLC’s modus 
operandi as part of its case in the crimes 
allegedly committed in the CAR, these 
groups believe that the Prosecutor has evi-
dence and information about how the MLC 
functioned in the DRC.
Mariana Pena, the permanent repre-
sentative to the ICC of the International 
Federation for Human Rights, contends 
that the lack of a decision to prosecute 
Bemba thus far for crimes committed in 
the DRC is telling:
The Prosecutor has not said for-
mally he isn’t going to prosecute 
Bemba [over these allegations], 
but his trial is starting and there 
have been no attempts over the 
last two or three years to charge 
him with crimes in DRC, so you 
read from the context there is no 
intention to prosecute.
Although an ICC spokesman has said 
that further legal action is not ruled out, 
the Prosecutor has already elected to delay 
prosecution regarding the alleged crimes 
in the DRC. Even if further legal action is 
planned, the Prosecutor could potentially 
miss his window to prosecute Bemba for 
his alleged crimes in the DRC. Article 
67(c) of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
provides that among the rights of the 
accused is the right “[t]o be tried without 
undue delay.” If a separate trial were to be 
brought against Bemba in the future, his 
defense could potentially argue that this 
right has been violated by the Prosecutor’s 
failure to act in the interest of efficiency 
by excluding these charges in the first trial. 
By comparison, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda has “considered that 
an inexcusable delay attributable to the 
Prosecutor . . . entitles the accused to have 
the charges dropped ‘with prejudice’ to the 
Prosecutor . . . .” In a specific instance, the 
Human Rights Committee considered that 
Canada violated the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights’ provision 
(upon which the Rome Statue’s is modeled) 
for trial without undue delay when the 
preparation for an appeal hearing resulted 
in a three-year delay.
Bemba’s defense could also look to 
Article 60(4) to argue that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in a future case is obligated to 
release Bemba. Article 60(4) provides:
The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure 
that a person is not detained for an 
unreasonable period prior to trial 
due to inexcusable delay by the 
Prosecutor. If such delay occurs, 
the Court shall consider releas-
ing the person, with or without 
conditions.
The success of these potential argu-
ments hinges upon the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
interpretation of the statute. However, the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to include all 
possible charges against Bemba in the first 
complaint could unnecessarily provide an 
opportunity for Bemba to escape facing 
further charges. It is possible that the evi-
dence used to establish the aforementioned 
modus operandi does not provide a suf-
ficient basis for filing additional charges. 
Nevertheless, reluctance to file charges 
with regard to Bemba’s alleged crimes in 
the DRC calls into question the thorough-
ness and completeness of the OTP’s current 
case.
proSeCuTor ThreaTenS iCC 
involvemenT in ivory CoaST
On December 21, 2010, International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo issued a statement on the 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). 
Ivory Coast is now steeped in violence 
following incumbent president Laurent 
Gbagbo’s refusal to hand over his office to 
Alassane Outtara, winner of November’s 
presidential elections. The situation has 
not escaped the attention of the United 
Nations, and was highlighted in a report 
from Kyung-wha Kang, the UN deputy 
high commissioner for human rights to a 
special session of the UN Human Rights 
council in Geneva. “Between December 
16 and December 21, human rights offi-
cers have substantiated allegations of 173 
killings, 90 instances of torture and ill 
treatment, 471 arrests and detentions, and 
24 cases of enforced or involuntary disap-
pearances,” reported Kang.
UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
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In making this statement, the Prosecutor 
has made a political statement by exerting 
pressure with the threat of possible ICC 
intervention. Ocampo promised that he 
would open an investigation should any 
“serious crimes” under the jurisdiction 
of the ICC be committed. The Prosecutor 
specifically mentioned Charles Blé Goudé, 
a youth leader who has used incendi-
ary language during daily-televised rallies, 
warning him of the possible consequences. 
Ocampo also warned that the UN would 
respond if its peacekeepers or forces were 
attacked, which has been a concern.
Ocampo continued by suggesting that 
African states can find a solution to the 
problem. But, failing that, “African states 
could be willing to refer the case to my 
Office and also provide forces to arrest 
those individuals who commit the crimes in 
Côte d’Ivoire.” This last statement appears 
to be encouraging domestic institutions to 
handle the situation. This goal falls under 
the prerogative of complementarity, a prin-
ciple based on the idea that the ICC is a 
“court of last resort,” and will only initiate 
proceedings where domestic jurisdictions 
are unwilling or unable to investigate and 
prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the court.
This action speaks to the role of poli-
tics and persuasion within the Prosecutor’s 
work. While it appears that the Prosecutor’s 
statement is attempting to advance the call 
for complementarity and prevent crimes 
from being committed, states may question 
whether his chosen method in this instance 
was an appropriate one. In attempting to 
force Ivory Coast’s hand in this matter, 
the OTP is exerting a measure of political 
pressure. Given that Ivory Coast is not a 
party to the Rome Statute, the prosecutor 
would be required to open a case in this 
situation via ad hoc submission pursu-
ant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute 
or Security Council referral, outlined in 
Article 13(b). The Prosecutor could con-
tend that the ultimate goals, encouraging 
the intervention of domestic institutions 
and prevention of further violence, are 
within his authority. The Prosecutor made 
no mention of whether the Ivory Coast is 
“unwilling and unable” to handle the mat-
ter domestically, a requirement set forth by 
the Rome Statute, making the discussion 
of an investigation potentially premature. 
This, combined with statements promis-
ing prosecutions prior to the initiation of 
formal investigations, could lead States 
Parties to the Rome Statute to question 
whether the Prosecutor is overstepping his 
boundaries.
Another concern is whether the 
Prosecutor’s actions could be used against 
him in court should the OTP proceed 
with an investigation and eventual prosecu-
tion. Potentially, the accused could argue 
that the Prosecutor has taken a prejudi-
cial stance regarding guilt prior to the 
investigation. Given all of the existing 
political pressure on Ivory Coast, it is 
debatable whether potentially circumvent-
ing the rules and procedures of the ICC in 
exchange for additional political pressure 
advances the ICC’s cause. Additionally, 
in future instances, if the Prosecutor were 
to act in a similarly preemptive capac-
ity, it is unclear how States Parties to the 
Rome Statute would react. Perhaps it will 
engender further complementarity, but it is 
conceivable that this will be another point 
of criticism for states such as Kenya, which 
has recently been reluctant to cooperate 
with the Court, to further question the 
ICC’s authority.
On January 25, 2011, the Prosecutor 
announced that he began collecting infor-
mation about the alleged violations in 
Ivory Coast. “The judges have to be sure, 
my job now is to define if we have to inter-
vene or not?” he stated, adding that his 
“job is not political.” The OTP has taken a 
position to work towards complementarity 
and to discourage potential violence—both 
of which are primary goals of the ICC. But 
the means by which the OTP has acted to 
achieve these ends are political ones, leav-
ing it vulnerable to further criticism and a 
continued lack of cooperation from various 
States.
Slava Kuperstein, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers the International Criminal 
Court for the Human Rights Brief.
inTernaTional Criminal Tribunal 
For rWanda
iCTr permiTS diSCloSure oF 
ConFidenTial WiTneSS TeSTimony To 
FranCe
On September 16, 2010, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) ruled to vary witness pro-
tective measures in Nzabonimana, allow-
ing the disclosure of confidential wit-
ness information to assist France in its 
investigation and domestic prosecution of 
international crimes committed in Rwanda 
in 1994. The tribunal relied on its decision 
in Nyiramasuhuko et al, in which protected 
testimony was disclosed to Danish authori-
ties on the basis that the principle of state 
cooperation articulated in Article 28 of 
the ICTR statute also applies to requests 
from states to the tribunal. Although the 
decision in Nzabonimana is not entirely 
unique, it indicates that the ICTR’s liberal 
approach to granting protective measures 
may extend beyond the life of the tribunal, 
particularly in relation to the domestic 
prosecution of international crimes.
The ICTR stated in the Nzabonimana 
decision that it does not grant witness 
protective measures based solely on a 
witness’s subjective fear of testifying, but 
also considers an objective standard when 
determining whether the witness’s security 
it threatened. Despite this intention, the 
ICTR has been criticized for its zealous 
approach to granting protective measures. 
Professor Göran Sluiter suggests that pro-
tective measures have been granted as an 
automatic right rather than a provision for 
exceptional circumstances in which a wit-
ness’s security is threatened, which may be 
inconsistent with the principle of transpar-
ent trials.
Rule 75(F) of the ICTR Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence provides that wit-
ness protective measures are effective until 
altered by the tribunal. To alter or remove 
protective measures, the tribunal has held 
in practice that the party seeking varia-
tion must demonstrate that the protected 
witness gave his or her clear consent to 
the variation, or that the situation that ini-
tially justified the protective measures has 
changed. In Nzabonimana, the Prosecutor 
submitted an affidavit from the witness 
giving his full consent to the disclosure of 
materials to French authorities. However, 
if the witness does not consent to the vari-
ance of protective measures, the tribunal 
has considerable discretion in determining 
whether to amend the measures.
The ICTR anticipates that amending 
witness protective orders will remain an 
issue following the completion of pro-
ceedings. Therefore, in light of the many 
orders issued, the tribunal suggested a lim-
ited review of witness protection orders it 
expects will require alteration, rather than 
a comprehensive review of all protection 
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orders. The Office of Legal Counsel is 
considering the most effective manner to 
conduct such a review.
Whatever the tribunal’s ultimate 
approach, its policy could significantly 
affect witness security and international 
criminal justice, particularly if the tri-
bunal varies or rescinds protective mea-
sures without the witness’s consent. If the 
ICTR decides whether or not to vary or 
rescind protective measures in advance of 
a request, it risks not accounting for future, 
unknown circumstances that could threaten 
the security of a witness. Consideration 
of possible threats to a witness’s security 
becomes more complicated as non-parties, 
such as France, seek access to testimony 
for national prosecution of international 
crimes.
The ICTR must balance the challenge 
of amending a large number of witness 
protective measures without knowledge of 
future circumstances that could threaten 
witnesses’ security with the need for tribu-
nal documents to be publicly available to 
promote state cooperation with the ICTR. 
As states, such as France, prosecute inter-
national crimes in domestic courts, docu-
ments from international tribunals could 
be invaluable resources to fair and efficient 
proceedings. Although the ICTR has liber-
ally granted witness protective measures, it 
must nevertheless prioritize witness secu-
rity as it seeks to efficiently review a large 
number of orders.
SeCuriTy CounCil voTeS To eSTabliSh 
iCTr reSidual meChaniSm
On December 22, 2010, the Security 
Council voted on S/RES/1966 (2010) 
(Resolution 1966) to establish the 
International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism). As the 
international community has anticipated 
the end of tribunal proceedings, informal 
working groups sought to determine the 
best way to address residual issues. The 
groups debated topics including: whether 
the necessary residual functions required 
semi-permanent institutions or ad hoc 
responses, whether one mechanism should 
be established for all international criminal 
tribunals or if each tribunal should have 
its own mechanism, and the extent to 
which cost and efficiency should influence 
the options. Resolution 1966 establishes 
separate Mechanisms for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The 
Mechanism for the ICTR will continue the 
“jurisdiction, rights and obligations, and 
essential functions” of the ICTR beginning 
July 1, 2012.
State cooperation with the Mechanism 
will be necessary to ensure that it remains a 
“small, temporary and efficient structure” 
with its operations reducing over time, and 
does not develop into a complex replace-
ment institution. The ICTR’s December 
2010 Completion Strategy Report high-
lighted many issues that will be of concern 
to the Mechanism and cooperating states, 
such as prosecution of remaining fugitives 
and relocation of individuals acquitted or 
convicted by the ICTR or the Mechanism.
The ICTR has not yet prosecuted ten 
indicted fugitives that remain in neighbor-
ing countries. The ICTR particularly seeks 
cooperation from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, where most of the fugi-
tives remain, and Kenya, where Félicien 
Kabuga, accused of financing the 1994 
genocide, allegedly lives. While the ICTR 
has attempted to work with national police 
to arrest the fugitives, the Mechanism will 
likely inherit the responsibility of pros-
ecuting them upon arrest. Article 1 of the 
Mechanism’s Transitional Arrangements 
states that the Mechanism “shall have 
competence over” a fugitive arrested after 
July 1, 2012. However, according to Article 
6 of the Statute of the Mechanisms, the 
Mechanism must make every effort to refer 
cases to national courts, after considering 
the gravity of crimes charged and the like-
lihood that the accused will receive a fair 
trial. After the Mechanism refers a case to 
national courts, it must assist the state upon 
request in the investigation, prosecution 
and trial of an accused, and monitor the 
case’s progress.
Additionally, the Mechanism will 
require state cooperation in relocating indi-
viduals who were acquitted or who have 
served their sentences, but who have not 
been resettled and remain in safe houses in 
Arusha. In his speech to the UN Security 
Council, President of the ICTR Judge 
Byron explained that some of these indi-
viduals are in a “legal vacuum,” and many 
others will be in similar situations in the 
future as they complete their sentences. 
The Mechanism will assume responsibil-
ity for ensuring that these persons are 
relocated, a task necessary to ensure the 
“interests of justice and the rule of law,” 
but impossible without state cooperation.
Resolution 1966 passed by a vote of 
fourteen to none, with Russia abstaining 
because it believed that the ad hoc tribunals 
had sufficient time to complete their opera-
tions in accordance with the Completion 
Strategies. Regardless of whether the ICTR 
completes its operations by the projected 
date, there will undoubtedly be residual 
issues that must be addressed to avoid 
undermining the breakthrough achieve-
ments of the ad hoc tribunals. Just as state 
cooperation is required to promptly fulfill 
the ICTR Completion Strategy, the subse-
quent Mechanism will also require state 
cooperation to ensure its responsibilities 
gradually diminish, ultimately resulting in 
the accomplishment of the ICTR mandate.
deFenSe in NgiraBatwarE moveS To 
diSqualiFy Trial Chamber ii’S judges
On January 5, 2011, Augustin 
Ngirabatware’s defense counsel at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) submitted a motion to 
disqualify Trial Chamber II’s judges pursu-
ant to rule 15(b) of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. Rule 15 allows a judge to 
be disqualified from any case in which she 
has any association that might affect her 
impartiality. In Rutaganda, the ICTR held 
that judges are presumed to be impartial. 
In Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, the 
ICTR applied principles articulated by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber 
to interpret the impartiality requirement. 
Specifically, an unacceptable appearance 
of bias exists if a judge is a party to a case, 
has a direct interest in the outcome of a 
case, or if a reasonable observer, someone 
informed of all the relevant circumstances, 
including the traditions of integrity and 
impartiality of judges, and who understand 
that judges swear to uphold the duty of 
being impartial, would apprehend bias.
The defense in Ngirabatware stated that 
the judges have shown “such a deep-seated 
antagonism against the Defence” that a 
fair trial is “compromised and impos-
sible.” The motion alleges judicial interfer-
ence during the trial proceedings in favor 
of the prosecution, such as cutting short 
defense counsel’s attempts to elicit contra-
dictory evidence from a witness, denial of 
adequate time for the defense to prepare, 
undue delay in the Trial Chambers’ deliv-
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judgmenT SummarieS: inTernaTional 
Criminal Tribunal For rWanda
CalixTe kalimanzira v. The 
proSeCuTor, appealS judgmenT, 
CaSe no. iCTr-05-88-a
On October 20, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its 
judgment in the case against Callixte 
Kalimanzira, directeur de cabinet in 
the Rwandan Ministry of Interior. Trial 
Chamber III had previously found 
Kalimanzira guilty of aiding and abetting 
genocide, instigating genocide, and direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, 
sentencing him to thirty years imprison-
ment. The Appeals Chamber accepted six 
of Kalimanzira’s nine grounds of appeal 
and reduced his sentence to twenty-five 
years imprisonment.
Among Kalimanzira’s successful 
grounds of appeal was a challenge to the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that he had aided 
and abetted genocide through his presence 
at the inauguration of Elie Ndayambaje as 
bougmestre of Muganza Commune, during 
which Ndayambaje allegedly instigated 
the killing of Tutsis with genocidal intent. 
As an initial matter, the Appeals Chamber 
held that, in view of Kalimanzira’s posi-
tion as directeur de cabinet of the Ministry 
of Interior, his silent presence during 
Ndayambaje’s inflammatory inaugural 
speech could reasonably have been inter-
preted as tacit approval of the message. 
Before turning to whether this silent pres-
ence substantially contributed to the kill-
ings for purposes of supporting the aid-
ing and abetting conviction, however, the 
Appeals Chamber, with Judge Pocar dis-
senting, determined that there was insuf-
ficient evidence that Tutsis were, in fact, 
killed as a result of Ndayambaje’s speech. 
Judge Pocar disagreed with the majority 
that Kalimanzira had demonstrated that no 
reasonable finder of fact could have deter-
mined that acts of genocide occurred as a 
result of Ndayambaje’s inaugural address.
The Appeals Chamber also reversed 
Kalimanzira’s conviction for instigating 
and aiding and abetting genocide in rela-
tion to killings at the Butare-Gisagara road-
block, based on a finding that Kalimanzira 
had received insufficient notice of this 
crime to prepare a defense. The Defense 
had first objected to the lack of notice 
regarding Kalimanzira’s alleged crimes at 
the Butare-Gisagara roadblock during trial, 
but the Trial Chamber held that although 
the indictment was vague, it was satisfied 
that this defect had been cured through 
the Prosecution’s pre-trial brief and the 
Prosecution’s opening statement. The 
Appeals Chamber disagreed, noting the 
inaccurate description of the roadblock’s 
location in the Prosecution’s pre-trial brief, 
the short time-period between the filing 
of the French translation of the pre-trial 
brief, and the leading of evidence regard-
ing this incident, and the Prosecution’s 
statement that the pre-trial brief contained 
no new allegations. While recognizing 
that the Prosecution’s opening statement 
clearly referred to allegations at the Butare-
Gisagara roadblock, the Appeals Chamber 
held that the opening statement alone was 
insufficient to cure the defect.
Another successful ground of appeal 
from the Defense related to Kalimanzira’s 
convictions by the Trial Chamber for direct 
and public incitement to genocide at the 
Jaguar and Kajyanama roadblocks. The Trial 
Chamber had based the Jaguar roadblock 
conviction on its finding that Kalimanzira 
appeared at the roadblock on a particular day, 
handed a rifle to a man standing at the road-
block, and told a group of “several others” 
that the “gun was to be used to kill Tutsis.” 
With regard to the Kajyanama roadblock, 
the Trial Chamber found that Kalimanzira 
had exhorted the people manning the road-
block to carry arms to “defend themselves 
against ‘the enemy’” and that he “was under-
stood to be calling for the killing of Tutsis.” 
In addition, the Trial Chamber noted that 
Kalimanzira had “underscored” this call by 
slapping a person who was not carrying a 
weapon and removing that person from the 
roadblock. Reviewing these findings, the 
Appeals Chamber first recalled an earlier 
holding that “supervising a specific group of 
individuals managing a roadblock does not 
constitute public incitement to commit geno-
cide” and noted that all previous convictions 
before the ICTR for direct and public incite-
ment to genocide involved “speeches made 
to large, fully public assemblies, messages 
disseminated by the media, and communica-
tions made through a public address system 
of a broad public area.” In addition, noting 
that the ICTR Statute’s language regard-
ing the crime of genocide tracks that of the 
Genocide Convention, the Appeals Chamber 
stressed that the travaux préparatoires of the 
ery of decisions, and inconsistency in deci-
sions. The defense concludes, “[w]hen the 
Trial Chamber always favors the same side, 
it creates an appearance of partiality to any 
impartial observer.”
The defendants in the RUF case in the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
moved for the disqualification of Judge 
Bankole Thompson based on the appear-
ance of bias. Judge Thompson had previ-
ously written a book in which he stated 
that the armed organization of which the 
defendants were members was guilty of 
human rights violations. Although Judge 
Thompson believed he could impartially 
adjudicate the case, his colleagues recused 
him because a reasonable bystander would 
likely perceive bias after reading the book. 
By comparison, Ngirabatware’s motion for 
disqualification of judges is not based 
on the appearance of bias from exter-
nal factors. Instead, the motion is based 
on internal trial activities and decisions. 
Additionally, in the SCSL case the defense 
sought to disqualify one individual judge, 
rather than an entire panel of judges as in 
Ngirabatware.
Theodor Meron, a judge in the ICTY and 
ICTR Appeals Chambers, claims that the 
structure of international tribunals, which 
includes a panel of judges that engage in 
discussion before rendering a judgment, 
ensures that any individual judge’s latent 
bias does not influence the outcome of a 
case. Meron acknowledged that tribunals 
should not be immune from criticism, but 
argued that criticism motivated solely by 
dislike for the results of a case may be 
“unfounded and excessive.” Ngirbatware’s 
motion sets out over 200 pages of criti-
cism directed at all of the judges assigned 
to the case, and was introduced late in the 
proceedings. While the ICTR must fairly 
evaluate all evidence to ensure that judg-
ment in Ngirbatware is not characterized 
by systematic bias, it should not disqualify 
judges based on the defense’s dissatisfac-
tion with the progress of the case. If the 
ICTR orders the dismissal of an entire trial 
chamber, the legitimacy of the tribunal’s 
previous rulings could be compromised.
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for 
the Human Rights Brief.
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Genocide Convention “confirms that pub-
lic incitement to genocide pertains to mass 
communications.” Indeed, the drafters of 
the Genocide Convention, according to the 
Appeals Chamber, expressly removed “pri-
vate incitement,” understood as “more subtle 
forms of communication such as conversa-
tions, private meetings, or messages,” from 
the scope of the definition of genocide.
Turning to the facts before it, the 
Appeals Chamber determined that 
Kalimanzira’s instructions were intended 
only for those manning the roadblocks and 
not the general public, and thus it reversed 
his convictions for direct and public incite-
ment to genocide. Judge Pocar delivered a 
separate opinion on this subject, making 
clear that while he agreed with the decision 
to overturn the convictions, he viewed the 
Appeals Chamber’s emphasis on the size 
of the audience being incited as setting a 
dangerous precedent as to what minimum 
audience size is required to establish direct 
and public incitement to genocide. Instead, 
Judge Pocar drew on the ICTR jurispru-
dence from the Akayesu and Kajelijeli 
cases and argued that the Appeals Chamber 
should have considered the circumstances 
of the incitement, including where the 
incitement occurred and whether or not the 
audience was select or limited.
A further conviction for direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide, 
based on a speech Kalimanzira allegedly 
gave at the Nyabisagara football field 
in Kibayi Commune, was reversed based 
on a finding that the Trial Chamber had 
relied exclusively on uncorroborated evi-
dence of a single Prosecution witness and 
failed to adequately address conflicting 
evidence presented by five Defense wit-
nesses. On similar grounds, the Appeals 
Chamber reversed Kalimanzira’s convic-
tion for direct and public incitement to 
genocide regarding events at the Gisagara 
Marketplace. The Trial Chamber had relied 
on a single witness’s uncorroborated state-
ment that Kalimanzira had criticized mem-
bers of the crowd for being unarmed, and 
instructed them to kill young Tutsi girls. 
The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial 
Chamber failed to provide a clear explana-
tion for accepting the witness’s uncorrobo-
rated identification of Kalimanzira.
Kalimanzira also appealed his convic-
tion for aiding and abetting genocide in 
relation to the massacre at Kabuye hill in 
April 1994, which was described by the 
Trial Chamber as an “enormous human 
tragedy.” Kalimanzira argued that there 
was insufficient evidence of his substan-
tial contribution to acts of genocide. The 
Appeals Chamber noted evidence from 
survivors of the massacre that Kalimanzira 
had instructed Tutsis at the Gisagara mar-
ketplace to seek refuge at Kabuye hill, 
promising safety. Kalimanzira, along with 
armed soldiers and policemen, had then 
gone to the hill, and used their firearms to 
massacre the Tutsis. The Appeals Chamber 
held that it was reasonable to find that 
Kalimanzira had provided substantial assis-
tance to the massacre, even if that assis-
tance was unknown to the principal per-
petrators of the massacre. The remaining 
appeal grounds that were rejected by the 
Appeals Chamber included Kalimanzira’s 
submissions that his authority and alibi 
were inappropriately assessed and a sen-
tencing appeal by the Prosecution, which 
argued that the gravity of the crimes com-
mitted necessitated imprisonment for the 
remainder of Kalimanzira’s life.
While almost all of Kalimanzira’s con-
victions were reversed, the Appeals Chamber 
characterized Kalimanzira’s remaining con-
viction of aiding and abetting the genocide 
of Tutsis at Kabuye hill as “an extremely 
serious crime.” The Appeals Chamber 
accordingly sentenced Kalimanzira to 
twenty-five years imprisonment.
John Coleman, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, wrote this 
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief. 
Sam Szoke-Burke, Consultant for the War Crimes 
Research Office, edited this summary for the 
Human Rights Brief.
The proSeCuTor v. yuSSuF 
munyakazi, Trial judgmenT, CaSe 
no. iCTr-97-36a-T
On July 5, 2010, Trial Chamber I of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) sentenced Yussuf Munyakazi, who 
has been in prison since 2004, to a twenty-
five year term for his participation in and 
leadership of the Bugarama Interahamwe dur-
ing the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Trial 
Chamber determined that Munyakazi, a well-
known local businessman and rice farmer in 
Bugarama commune, served as a de facto 
leader of the Interahamwe in planning and 
executing two attacks on Tutsi refugees.
 Munyakazi was initially indicted by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber on three counts: 
genocide, complicity in genocide, and 
extermination as a crime against humanity. 
Ultimately, he was found guilty of geno-
cide and extermination as a crime against 
humanity and not guilty of complicity in 
genocide, specifically because complicity 
was charged in the alternative to genocide. 
The convictions were based on two attacks 
Munyakazi led on Shangi and Mibilizi 
parishes between April 29 and 30, 1994, 
which resulted in the deaths of approxi-
mately 5,000 Tutsi. Munyakazi offered two 
alibis to counter the charges that he partici-
pated in the attacks, but the Chamber found 
neither to be credible. In both instances, the 
defense failed to present any alibi until just 
before trial. Additionally, the defense did 
not provide any witnesses to corroborate 
Munyakazi’s version of events, which was 
inconsistent throughout the pretrial exami-
nation process.
Although the Prosecution was unable to 
show evidence that the accused personally 
killed Tutsi civilians, the Chamber never-
theless found Munyakazi guilty of “com-
mitting” genocide and the crime against 
humanity of extermination under Article 
6(1) of the ICTR Statute. As an initial 
matter, the Chamber recalled the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber’s holding in the Seromba 
case that, “in the context of genocide . . . 
‘direct and physical perpetration’ need 
not mean physical killing; other acts can 
constitute direct participation in the actus 
reus of the crime.” The question, according 
to the Seromba Chamber, is whether the 
actions of the accused “were as much an 
integral part of the genocide as were the 
killings which they enabled.” Applying this 
standard to the case, the Trial Chamber first 
determined that, although Munyakazi did 
not hold any official post within the local 
branch of the MRND, he exercised de facto 
control over the Bugarama Interahamwe 
and was the leader of the group’s attacks on 
Shangi parish and Mibilizi parish. Indeed, 
witnesses from Shangi and Mibilizi par-
ishes testified that Munyakazi was the one 
giving orders to the Interahamwe, and wit-
nesses who saw him with other members of 
the Interahamwe testified that those people 
behaved as if Munyakazi was their leader. 
Thus, although the Prosecution was unable 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Munyakazi was the single de jure leader of 
the Bugarama Interahamwe, the Chamber 
was convinced that he was a leader, and 
one who exercised significant de facto 
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control over the group in relation to the 
relevant attacks.
On the basis of leadership, the Chamber 
concluded that Munyakazi “was as much 
an integral part of the killings as those he 
enabled, and that he approved and embraced 
the decision to commit the crimes as his 
own.” Furthermore, the Chamber found that 
both Shangi parish and Mibilizi parish were 
attacked with the purpose of eliminating all 
the Tutsi refugees who had sought shelter 
there. The Chamber found that it was not 
clear from the evidence presented whether 
Munyakazi himself had personal animosity 
towards the Tutsi people, or if he was simply 
trying to gain favor with the MRND lead-
ership. The court determined that he had 
nevertheless demonstrated a specific intent 
to destroy the Tutsi in Shangi and Mibilizi 
parishes, as required for the charge of geno-
cide. Furthermore, the Chamber found that 
Munyakazi knew his actions were part of a 
“widespread and systematic attack” against 
the Tutsi people, and therefore also found 
him guilty of committing extermination as a 
crime against humanity.
In addition to the attacks on Shangi 
and Mibilizi parishes, Munyakazi was 
charged with responsibility for an attack 
on Nyamasheke parish that occurred on 
April 16, 1994. Although Prosecution wit-
nesses testified that Munyakazi was the 
first of the Interahamwe to enter the church 
and that he appeared to be giving orders, 
accomplice witnesses for the defense tes-
tified that on April 16, 1994, they were 
with the Bugarama Interahamwe at the 
CIMERWA cement factory. CIMERWA, 
which is close to Bugarama, is quite far 
from Nyamasheke parish, so it would not 
have been possible for both attacks to 
occur in a single day. Additionally, three 
defense witnesses living nearby testified 
that Nyamasheke parish was attacked sev-
eral times over a period of days, but not 
on April 16. The Chamber concluded that 
the reports of multiple attacks, combined 
with the distance between CIMERWA 
and Nyamasheke parish, left a reason-
able doubt as to whether Munyakazi par-
ticipated in an attack in Nyamasheke on 
April 16, 1994. The Chamber also found 
that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the Prosecution’s allegation that 
Munyakazi participated in a joint criminal 
enterprise aimed at destroying the Tutsi 
population, in whole or in part, by pro-
viding the Bugarama Interahamwe with 
housing, food, transportation, weapons and 
military training.
 In sentencing Munyakazi, the Chamber 
noted that the penalty imposed should 
“reflect the goals of retribution, deter-
rence, rehabilitation, and the protection 
of society.” Furthermore, the Chamber 
stated that, pursuant to Article 23 of the 
ICTR Statute, it would consider the gen-
eral practice regarding prison sentences 
in Rwanda, the gravity of the offenses, 
and the individual circumstances of the 
accused, including aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. For the gravity of 
the offense, the Chamber stressed that the 
attacks on Shangi and Mibilizi parishes 
resulted in a substantial number of deaths 
and a great deal of human suffering. It also 
recognized that “commission” is a direct 
form of participation in the crime. Noting 
that under Rwandan law, similar crimes 
may be punished by life imprisonment, the 
Chamber explained that, in the practice of 
the ICTR, such sentences were “reserved 
for those who planned or ordered atrocities 
as well as the most senior authorities.” The 
only aggravating factor considered by the 
Chamber was Munyakazi’s abuse of his 
superior position, while his advanced age 
was the only mitigating factor to which the 
Chamber gave weight. The Defense also 
pointed to the fact that Munyakazi had 
provided assistance to a select number of 
Tutsi friends during the genocide, but the 
Chamber held that it was in its discretion 
to disregard such “selective assistance” to 
Tutsis. In the end, the sentence of twenty-
five years was imposed as a single sen-
tence for each of the crimes for which 
Munyakazi was convicted.
Beka Feathers, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, wrote this 
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief. 
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the 
War Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
The proSeCuTor v. dominique 
nTaWukulilyayo, Trial judgmenT, 
CaSe no. iCTr-05-82-T
On August 3, 2010, Trial Chamber III 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) issued a judgment in the 
case against Dominique Ntawukulilyayo, 
former sub-prefect of Gisagara sub-prefec-
ture in Butare. Ntawukulilyayo was found 
guilty of genocide under Article 2 of the 
ICTR Statute and not guilty of complicity 
in genocide and direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide. He was sen-
tenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.
In its indictment, the Prosecution 
alleged that Ntawukulilyayo was responsi-
ble for genocide or, in the alternative, com-
plicity in genocide, based on his alleged 
role in events that occurred between April 
20 and 25, 1994, at Gisagara market and 
Kabuye hill. The evidence established that 
on April 20, 1994, thousands of Tutsis 
fleeing attacks from Hutus sought refuge 
at Gisagara market. The following day, 
several of the displaced persons tried to 
depart the market for Burundi, but law 
enforcement personnel prevented them 
from leaving. From April 21 through April 
23, many of the refugees at Gisagara mar-
ket were ordered to leave the market and 
go to Kabuye hill where, beginning on 
April 23, armed civilians, police, and mili-
tary personnel killed or seriously injured 
up to 25,000 primarily Tutsi refugees. 
The Defense did not deny that the events 
occurred, but claimed that Ntawukulilyayo 
had no role in relation to the events. 
According to the Defense, Ntawukulilyayo 
was never present at Kabuye hill and he 
only visited the market to inquire about 
the welfare of the refugees and inform 
them of his efforts to obtain assistance. 
By contrast, the Prosecution argued that 
Ntawukulilyayo bore responsibility for 
genocide or complicity in genocide based 
on his role in convincing Tutsis to go to 
Kabuye hill and his role in the subsequent 
attack on Tutsis at the hill. The charge of 
direct and public incitement to genocide 
was based on two separate counts. The 
first involved a public address delivered 
by Ntawukulilyayo on April 24 in which 
he allegedly promised houses, land, and 
money to those who killed the most Tutsis. 
The second count was based on allegations 
that Ntawukulilyayo had urged a crowd 
of people gathered in front of the deputy 
bourgmestre’s house in late May 1994 to 
search for and kill Tutsis before the arrival 
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
With regard to the events at Gisagara 
market and Kabuye hill, the Trial Chamber 
found insufficient evidence to support the 
allegations that Ntawukulilyayo ordered the 
interception of Tutsis seeking to flee to 
Burundi on April 20 and that he had a role 
in convincing Tutsis to leave the market 
for the hill on April 21 and 22. However, 
6
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol18/iss2/7
50
inTernaTional Criminal Tribunal 
For The Former yugoSlavia
iCTy appealS Chamber ruleS Trial 
Chamber Failed To addreSS WiTneSS 
inTimidaTion in haradinaj eT al
On July 21, 2010, the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), with 
President Robinson dissenting, granted the 
prosecution’s appeal for a partial retrial 
in the case of Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz 
Balaj, and Lahi Brahima. The retrial is 
based, in part, on charges relating to alle-
gations of prisoner abuse at a Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) detention facility 
in Jablanica. In the first instance, Trial 
Chamber I found the evidence before it 
was insufficient and acquitted all three of 
the accused of operating a joint criminal 
enterprise.
The Appeals Chamber ruled that Trial 
Chamber I erred by constraining the pros-
ecution to pre-determined time limits to 
present its case despite allegations of wit-
ness intimidation; by failing to properly 
respond to specific requests by the prose-
cution; and by failing to act proprio motu to 
facilitate witness testimony. Furthermore, 
the Appeals Chamber concluded that Trial 
Chamber I’s presumptions in the interest of 
efficiency compromised the fairness of the 
proceedings in light of witness intimida-
tion. The conflicting rulings by the Trial 
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in 
Haradinaj et al highlight the inherent chal-
lenges of compelling unwilling witnesses 
to testify.
The Appeals Chamber based its deci-
sion on the Trial Chamber’s failure to facil-
itate the testimony of two unwilling wit-
nesses who were present at the Jablanaca 
camp: Shefqet Kabashi, a former KLA 
prison camp guard and a protected wit-
ness who was imprisoned at the camp. The 
prosecution asserted that these witnesses 
possessed direct evidence as to the guilt 
of the accused, but the witnesses refused 
to testify out of fear and intimidation. 
Kabashi claims that he had received threats 
in previous cases at the ICTY where other 
protected witnesses had been killed. In lieu 
of an indictment, Trial Chamber I issued an 
order against Kabashi for contempt under 
Rule of Procedure and Evidence 77 when 
he refused to answer questions in court and 
then refused to testify via video conference 
after fleeing to the United States. Under 
a majority of the Trial Chamber found that 
Ntawukulilyayo came to Gisagara market 
on April 23 and told the refugees that they 
would be fed and protected at Kabuye 
hill, convincing many refugees to leave the 
market for the hill. In addition, a major-
ity of the Chamber found that, on April 
23, Ntawukulilyayo transported soldiers 
to Kabuye hill who subsequently attacked 
the Tutsi refugees. Ntawukulilyayo did not 
return and the assault continued through the 
following day, eventually including civil-
ian assailants. Based on these facts, the 
majority of the Chamber determined that 
Ntawukulilyayo was responsible for aid-
ing and abetting the killing of Tutsi civil-
ians by instructing the refugees at Gisagara 
market to move to Kabuye hill and by 
transporting soldiers who participated in 
the attack. Although no witness testified 
to having expressly heard Ntawukulilyayo 
give instructions to the soldiers he brought 
to Kabuye hill, the majority found he was 
liable for ordering the killing of Tutsis 
based on a finding that “his prominent role 
in removing Tutsis from Gisagara mar-
ket to Kabuye hill and his direct involve-
ment in transporting assailants to there” 
led to the conclusion that he ordered those 
he transported to kill the Tutsi refugees. 
Furthermore, due to the systematic and 
extensive nature of the attack, the majority 
was certain that the purpose of the attack 
was to eliminate the majority of Tutsi refu-
gees gathered on Kabuye hill. Finally, the 
majority found that Ntawukulilyayo had 
knowledge of the genocidal intent of the 
Kabuye hill assailants and that he shared 
in such intent. While the Prosecution also 
alleged that Ntawukulilyayo was guilty of 
genocide under a theory of superior respon-
sibility pursuant to Article 6(3) of the ICTR 
Statute, the Chamber found insufficient 
evidence demonstrating that, as sub-prefect, 
Ntawukulilyayo had the material ability to 
prevent the commission of offenses by com-
munal police, soldiers, and civilian assail-
ants or to punish those who committed 
offenses. Having convicted Ntawukulilyayo 
of genocide, the alternative of complicity in 
genocide was dismissed.
Judge Akay dissented from the major-
ity regarding Ntawukulilyayo’s conviction 
of genocide. While he found the evidence 
of events at Gisagara and Kabuye hill to be 
generally sound, the inconsistencies within 
witness testimonies raised doubts regard-
ing Ntawukulilyayo’s involvement in the 
events. According to the Akay, the specific 
accounts of Ntawukulilyayo’s whereabouts 
were far too inconsistent. He also found the 
Defense’s evidence that market traders and 
residents were responsible for instigating 
the flight of the refugees from the market 
because of deteriorating hygiene condi-
tions credible. Furthermore, he stressed 
that witness statements about the timing 
of Ntawukulilyayo’s arrival at Kabuye hill 
along with the type of vehicle he arrived 
in varied. Judge Akay acknowledged that 
the tense situation may have distorted the 
witnesses’ views, but he also found that the 
statements did not corroborate each other 
sufficiently to support a conviction beyond 
a reasonable doubt.
For the charge of direct and public 
incitement to genocide, the Chamber 
found that the evidence presented by the 
Prosecution insufficiently supported the 
allegations in the indictment regarding 
Ntawukulilyayo’s April 24 promise of 
housing, land, and money to those who 
killed Tutsis. The Chamber also was not 
convinced by the evidence in support of 
the allegation that Ntawukulilyayo urged 
a crowd of people to kill Tutsis before the 
arrival of the RPF in late May. Accordingly, 
the Chamber unanimously dismissed the 
incitement charge.
Finally, for purposes of sentencing, 
the Chamber considered the gravity of 
the offense for which Ntawukulilyayo 
was convicted, as well as aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. Aggravating cir-
cumstances included the fact that he had 
abused his position of authority in convinc-
ing the Tutsi refugees to move from the 
market to the hill, as well as the number of 
victims. Mitigating circumstances included 
Ntawukulilyayo’s age, relative health, and 
past actions. At the time of sentencing, 
Ntawukulilyayo was seventy years old and 
suffering from Diabetes. The Chamber 
further noted that prior to the 1994 geno-
cide, Ntawukulilyayo devoted part of his 
professional career to easing ethnic ten-
sions in Rwanda and that the evidence 
suggested his participation in killings may 
have resulted from trying to demonstrate 
his loyalty to the government rather than 
from any ethnic hatred.
Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, wrote this 
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief. 
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the 
War Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
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Appeals Chamber affirmed Šljivancˇanin’s 
first conviction and convicted him on an 
additional charge of aiding and abetting the 
murder of 194 prisoners during the same 
incident. Holding that Šljivancˇanin’s five-
year sentence did not sufficiently reflect 
the gravity of his first conviction and 
accounting for the new conviction, the 
Appeals Chamber sentenced Šljivancˇanin 
to 17 years’ imprisonment. At the begin-
ning of 2010, Šljivancˇanin applied for 
review of the additional conviction of aid-
ing and abetting murder, which resulted 
in the December 2010 vacation of the 
Appeals Chamber’s May 2009 judgment.
In considering the defense motion, the 
Appeals Chamber applied the two-step 
procedure for evaluating requests under 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) 
Part Eight. The first stage involved a pre-
liminary hearing in which the defense had 
the burden of showing that a “new fact,” 
“which was not known to the moving party 
at the time of the proceedings before . . . 
the Appeals Chamber, and could not have 
been discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence” had emerged that would have 
altered the Appeal Chamber’s decision. 
Having satisfied the first step, the Appeals 
Chamber then considered the weight of the 
new evidence and issued its ruling revers-
ing Šljivancˇanin’s prior sentence in order to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice.
The RPE designates the chamber from 
which the judgment in question took place 
to be the chamber that evaluates judg-
ment review requests. One criticism of this 
process is that it results in a system where 
chambers, by virtue of having the discre-
tion to decide what constitutes “new evi-
dence,” could dismiss meritorious requests 
because the requests conflict with prior rul-
ings. Prior to the success of Šljivancˇanin’s 
request for review judgment, all thirteen 
previous attempts for review judgment at 
the ICTY were dismissed at the first stage 
of RPE Part Eight’s process for failure 
to demonstrate new facts. Instead, the 
chambers ruled that these were “additional 
fact(s)” not meeting the standard of review 
because they were known at the time of the 
proceedings.
In his partially dissenting opinion, 
Judge Pocar agreed with the reversal of 
the aiding and abetting murder charge but 
disagreed with the majority’s decision to 
impose a ten-year sentence on Šljivancˇanin 
rather than the initial five-year sentence. 
Judge Pocar argued that the Appeals 
Chamber does not have the authority to 
issue a higher sentence than that of the 
Trial Chamber. Judge Pocar, who has made 
the similar arguments in other dissenting 
opinions, views the increased sentence 
under the Appeals Chamber’s decision as 
infringing on the generally accepted right 
of appeal under human rights law. He also 
argued that the Appeal Chambers erred 
in its application of procedure by holding 
a preliminary hearing to determine the 
“evidentiary value” of the submitted “new 
fact” prior to determining whether it could 
constitute a “new fact.”
Despite the split decision and Judge 
Pocar’s concerns regarding sentencing 
and procedural issues, the Šljivancˇanin 
review judgment demonstrates that the 
ICTY is willing to question its own rul-
ings. Although one decision is not enough 
to indicate a complete change of direction 
in the ICTY’s use of the review request 
process, that the Appeals Chamber granted 
the first successful request for a review 
judgment after sixteen years of the pro-
cedure being functionally dormant is a 
significant development in international 
criminal jurisprudence.
2009 WikileakS Cable revealS 
u.S. SupporT oF CroaTia’S eu bid 
deSpiTe iCTy oppoSiTion
A leaked 2009 U.S. Department of 
State (DOS) cable from Zagreb, Croatia 
reveals U.S. support for Croatia’s EU bid 
despite substantial opposition. The cable, 
sent on November 30, 2009, and provided 
to The Guardian by Wikileaks, reveals 
diplomatic efforts to persuade the UK to 
change its stance on Croatia’s accession 
despite International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Prosecutor 
Serge Brammertz’s critical assessments of 
Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. While 
it has been public knowledge that Croatia’s 
EU bid was contingent on cooperation with 
the ICTY and that the process was held 
up by the UK and the Netherlands, the 
Wikileaks cable reveals the complexity of 
the international political system that the 
ICTY occupies.
Finding that, “the impasse could under-
mine the U.S. stake both in the [Prime 
Minister of Croatia Jadranka] Kosor-led 
reform process in Croatia and the region’s 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions [,]” the DOS’ Zagreb office recom-
Rule 77, Trial Chamber I could direct the 
prosecution to investigate the matter, initi-
ate procedures itself, or have the registrar 
appoint an amicus curiae to investigate. 
In addition, Trial Chamber I, in opposi-
tion to the prosecution’s requests, held the 
prosecution to its previously allotted time 
in presenting its case. The prosecution is 
likely to seek testimony from Kabashi and 
the former KLA prisoner in the retrial to 
support joint criminal enterprise charges.
The Appeals Chamber based its rul-
ing in Haradinaj et al on what it regarded 
as an improper balance struck by the 
Trial Chamber, between addressing wit-
ness intimidation and maintaining trial 
expediency. Given the importance of the 
witnesses’ testimonies to the prosecution’s 
case, the Appeals Chamber held that the 
Trial Chamber’s decision “undermined the 
fairness of the proceedings . . . and resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice.” It would be a 
gross oversimplification to say the take-
away from the Appeals Chamber’s rul-
ing is that fairness considerations trump 
efficiency concerns. However, witness 
intimidation complicates ICTY procedure 
and, in addition to adjudicating cases, 
Trial Chambers are ultimately responsible 
for protecting witnesses. In cases involv-
ing witness intimidation, the Appeals 
Chambers’ ruling establishes that the Trial 
Chambers must be particularly cautious 
when implementing time constraints to 
avoid sacrificing fairness in the interest of 
efficiency.
iCTy appealS Chamber granTS 
FirST-ever revieW judgmenT in 
Šljivancˇanin CaSe
On December 8, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
vacated the May 2009 Appeals Chamber 
Judgment of Veselin Šljivancˇanin. The 
groundbreaking decision overturned 
Šljivancˇanin’s conviction for conspiracy to 
commit murder in light of new testimony 
undermining the mens rea element of that 
charge. In a split decision, the Appeals 
Chamber issued its first review judgment 
with two judges writing separately and one 
partially dissenting. Šljivancˇanin, a former 
lieutenant colonel in the Yugoslav Peoples’ 
Army (JNA), was originally sentenced by 
Trial Chamber III in September 2007 to 
five years imprisonment for aiding and 
abetting the torture of prisoners during the 
1991 Vukovar massacre. In May 2009, the 
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mended contesting Brammertz’s findings 
at a UN Security Council discussion on the 
ICTY. The Zagreb office also suggested 
“consider[ing] high-level approaches to 
the UK and Netherlands . . . urging that 
the EU make Croatia’s ICTY cooperation 
a closing rather than an opening bench-
mark for Chapter 23 accession negotia-
tions.” The leaked cable shows that French 
Ambassador Jérôme Pasquier thought 
France would also be willing to dissent 
from Brammetz’s conclusion. At the time 
the Cable was sent, cooperation with the 
ICTY was a barrier to opening Chapter 23 
negotiations – the body of EU treaty law 
that relates to judiciary and fundamental 
rights. Accession to the EU is contingent 
upon the applicant state demonstrating its 
compliance with Chapter 23. Therefore, 
Croatia must demonstrate that it has an 
independent and efficient judiciary, legal 
guarantees for fair trial procedures, and 
policies effectively addressing and deter-
ring corruption.
The cable identified Croatia’s failure to 
provide documents relating to the ICTY’s 
Gotovina et al. case and artillery docu-
ments relating to Operation Storm as a 
key point of contention between the U.S. 
assessment of Croatia’s cooperation and 
Brammertz’s assessment. A specially-cre-
ated Croatian task force reported that, out 
of twenty-three documents sought, it had 
delivered three full documents and one par-
tial draft of a document to the ICTY, four 
were never created, seven were destroyed, 
and eight had not yet been found. While 
U.S. Ambassador Stephen Rapp was satis-
fied with the task force’s work on address-
ing ICTY concerns, the cable reported 
that Brammertz “remain[ed] unwilling to 
acknowledge the full degree of Croatia’s 
cooperation.” The cable predicted that, 
“Croatia could be facing a prolonged and 
indefinite blockage of its EU accession.”
The cable shows that the U.S. diplo-
matically lobbied for Croatia, was prepared 
to challenge the ICTY’s determinations 
and that the U.S. had interests to protect 
in Croatia’s government under President 
Kosar. U.S. consultations with France and 
appeals to the UK on altering the EU’s 
stance on Croatia’s compliance with the 
ICTY provide rare insight into the politics 
of cooperation with the ICTY and their 
impact on accession into the EU.
Ivan Carpio, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for 
the Human Rights Brief. HRB
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